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Philistinism and the Preservation
of Nature
SIMON P. JAMES
Abstract
It is clear that natural entities can be preserved – they can be preserved because they
can be harmed or destroyed, or in various other ways adversely affected. I argue that
in light of the rise of scientism and other forms of philistinism, the political, reli-
gious, mythic, personal and historical meanings that people find in those entities
can also be preserved. Against those who impugn disciplines such as fine arts, phil-
osophy and sociology, I contend that this sort of preservation requires the efforts of
those whose work exemplifies the core values of the arts, the humanities and the
qualitative social sciences.
Not all environmentalists believe that our first priority should be to
preserve nature. Some think that we should set our sights on some
other target, such as the active transformation of natural
systems.1 And even those who do focus their energies on preser-
vation frequently disagree about which natural entities should be
preserved, about why they should be preserved, and about what
should be done to preserve them. Yet despite these differences of
opinion, it is widely acknowledged that nature can be preserved.
It can be preserved because it can be adversely affected in various
ways – hunted to extinction, denuded of vegetation, stripped of
topsoil, and so forth – and because some of these effects can be
prevented.
InThe History of the Countryside, Oliver Rackham has much to say
about these kinds of effects.2 In particular, he notes how, over the
centuries and especially since 1945, much of Britain’s natural heritage
1 See, e.g., the essays by Frederick Turner andWilliam R. Jordan in A.
D. Baldwin, Jr., J. de Luce, and C. Pletsch (eds), Beyond Preservation:
Restoring and Inventing Landscapes (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1994).
2
TheHistory of the Countryside: the classic history of Britain’s landscape,
flora and fauna (London: Phoenix Press, 1986).
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has been lost.3 That observation has been made by others of course,
yet Rackham’s case is distinctive in that it does not focus exclusively
on the various physical entities – fauna, flora, habitats, etc. – that have
disappeared from the British Isles. He claims that he is also concerned –
in fact ‘specially concerned’ – with the ‘loss of meaning’ that has
accompanied these physical changes.4 Thus in one passage Rackham
criticises the policy of only planting trees of officially approved
strains, selected for their commercial value. ‘A world in which all
oaks or ashes are genetically selected’, he writes, ‘will have lost much
of the meaning and beauty of oak and ash’.5 He objects, on similar
grounds, to the thoughtless and indiscriminate planting of trees. To
plant lime trees throughout the British Isles is, he maintains, to
occlude the ‘meaning’ embodied in the ‘mysterious natural distri-
bution’ of the tree.6 The horse chestnut has, similarly, been ‘deprived
of its meaning through being made the universal tree of bus-stations’.7
More would need to be said to explain how the terms ‘nature’,
‘meaning’ and ‘loss’ are to be understood in this context (and I
shall address these matters below). But for present purposes, it will
suffice to note that Rackham’s general claim – if not, perhaps, all of
his judgements about specific cases – would seem, at first sight, to
be plausible. It would indeed seem that nature’s meanings are like
wetlands and waterfowl – and unlike, say, abstract objects such as
the number five – in that they can disappear. It would appear that
nature’s meanings can be lost.
Environmental thinkers have hadmuch to say about which parts of
nature should be preserved andwhy, but they have had comparatively
little to say about this kind of loss, the loss of nature’smeanings. This,
I suggest, is to be regretted, for just as natural entities can be harmed,
eradicated, etc., so in many post-industrial liberal democracies
nature’s general ‘meaningfulness’ is currently threatened by the rise
of various forms of philistinism. In light of these tendencies, it is,
3 In what follows, I focus on the natural history of Britain. I do this
simply because I am familiar with this topic, and not because I believe
that my argument only applies to the wildlife, natural habitats, etc. of a
small group of islands in the North Atlantic. On the contrary, my case
applies to wildlife, etc. generally, regardless of its geographical location.
4 Op. cit. note 2, 26.
5 Op. cit. note 2, 247.
6 Op. cit. note 2, 29; cf. O. Rackham, Trees and Woodland in the British
Landscape: The Complete History of Britain’s Trees, Woods & Hedgerows
(Revised edition) (London: Phoenix Press, 1990), 204.
7 Op. cit. note 2, 54.
102
Simon P. James
I contend, possible to preserve the historical, mythic, religious, per-
sonal and political meanings that people find in the natural world.
This sort of preservation requires the efforts of those whose work ex-
emplifies the core values of the arts and humanities, and (assuming
that anti-positivists such asDilthey andWeber are correct)8 the quali-
tative social sciences too. Hence, if it is well taken, the argument I
develop provides one response to those who wonder what contri-
bution those in disciplines such as history, philosophy and sociology
might be able to make to the preservation of nature.
1.
I begin, not with the various philosophical issues indicated by talk of
nature and meaning, but by considering a distinctive approach to
natural history, one exemplified by television programmes such as
the BBC’s Birds Britannica and books such as Richard Mabey’s
Flora Britannica and Mark Cocker’s Birds Britannica.9
The first thing that may be noted about theworks of theBritannica
series and the sort of natural history they exemplify will seem ob-
viously true to many and highly contentious to some: they are
about nature.10 This is evidently not nature in the theologian’s
sense. It is true that Mabey et al. do not concern themselves with
angels, ghosts and other supernatural entities; however, their inter-
ests are not so broad as to encompass everything that is not superna-
tural. Nor, as we shall see, are works like Flora Britannica and Birds
Britannica about nature as opposed to culture. Rather, they are about
nature in what might be called the naturalist’s or natural historian’s
8 Defending that contentious assumption is beyond the scope of this
paper. For an introduction to the relevant issues, see David E. Cooper,
Meaning (Chesham: Acumen, 2003), Chapter 5.
9 E.g., R. Mabey, Flora Britannica (London: Sinclair-Stevenson,
1996); M. Cocker and R. Mabey, Birds Britannica (London: Chatto &
Windus, 2005). See also: R. Mabey, Nature Cure (London: Chatto &
Windus, 2005); Mabey, Beechcombings: The narratives of trees (London:
Vintage, 2007); Mabey, Weeds: A cultural history (London: Profile Books,
2010a); Mabey, A Brush with Nature (London: Random House, 2010b);
P. Marren and R. Mabey, Bugs Britannica (London: Chatto & Windus,
2010); S. Buczacki, Fauna Britannica (London: Hamlyn, 2005).
10 Steven Vogel is one writer who would dispute the claim that the
Britannica works are about nature. See his defence of ‘postnaturalism’ in
‘Environmental Philosophy after the End of Nature’, Environmental
Ethics 24 (spring 2002), 23–39.
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sense, which is to say that they focus on nonhuman organisms and the
ecological communities to which they belong.11The purview of these
works is, however, wider than that of some works of natural history.
For although Mabey et al. are not much concerned with those enti-
ties, like combustion engines and flat-screen TVs, whose current
states tend to be almost entirely the intended results of human
actions, they do not restrict their attention to those parts of the bio-
sphere that have been largely unaffected by human beings. So they
are concerned, not merely with wild organisms and their habitats,
but with entities that, although not ‘entirely instrumentalized by
human artifice’, as David Wiggins puts it, have nonetheless been ex-
tensively shaped by human actions.12
The second noteworthy feature of theworks in theBritannica series is
that their primary aim is not to communicate specialist scientific knowl-
edge but to convey the variousmeanings natural entities have for people.
Thus Mabey writes of the meanings plants have ‘as tokens of birth,
death, harvest and celebration, and omens of good (and bad) luck’, and
as ‘emblems of place and identity… not just of nations, but of villages,
neighbourhoods, even personal retreats’.13 For instance, he explains
that rowan trees (Sorbusaucuparia), the slender,berry-bearing trees fam-
iliar from suburban streets, were traditionally planted as a protection
against evil; that the common poppy (Papaver rhoeas) was thought to
symbolise ‘growth, blood and new life’ even in ancient times, and long
before JohnMcCrae’spoemof1915; that ash (Fraxinus excelsior)wastra-
ditionally regarded as a healing tree, and that in an ancient ceremony
ailing children would be ritually passed through a young tree split
down the middle and held open with wedges.14
11 True, ‘Nature is what naturalists study’ would not be a satisfactory
definition. But it is not my intention, here, to define nature. My aim is
simply to convey a general sense of what I am referring to when I use the
term ‘nature’. Furthermore, although in what follows I refer to natural ‘en-
tities’, I do not mean to suggest that naturalists are exclusively concerned
with things. On the contrary, they are typically concerned with a variety of
ontological categories – not just things, but processes, for instance, and
events. For a more detailed account of these issues, see Douglas J. Buege,
‘An Ecologically-informed Ontology for Environmental Ethics’, Biology
and Philosophy 12 (1997), 1–20.
12
‘The Presidential Address: Nature, Respect for Nature, and the
Human Scale of Values’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000),
1–32, at 10.
13 Mabey 1996, op. cit. note 9, 7.
14 Mabey 1996, op. cit. note 9, 203, 50–1, 326. Cf. Buczacki, op. cit.
note 9, 196, on the old belief that ash trees repel snakes.
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It is true that the meanings referred to by Mabey et al. are not all
alike. For one thing, they must be gauged in relation to a variety of
contexts. While one plant might have meaning in relation to certain
political ideals, the meaning of another might indicate a certain set
of religious teachings and practices. What is more, this relation can
take a variety of forms. An entity might have meaning by expressing
some mood or emotion, or by alluding to some historical event; alter-
natively, its meaning might be a function of its associations with love,
say, or death.15Furthermore, to provide a full account of the meaning
of any natural entity, one must identify the constituency of subjects
for whom the entity in question has meaning. But these complexities
need not detain us here. For now, it is enough to note that works like
Flora are about the many ways that natural entities make sense (or fail
tomake sense) to people in the living of their lives. On this broad con-
ception of meaning, they are about nature’s meanings.16
The third thing that may be noted about theBritannica books is that
they might seem, in one sense and to some extent, to have preserved
nature. This is not to say that they have indirectly helped to preserve
certain natural entities – by inspiring environmentalists, for instance –
though they might well have done that. It is to suggest that they have
directly preserved at least some of nature’s meanings. After all, many
15 On these different relations – expressive, allusive and associative,
respectively – see Cooper, A Philosophy of Gardens (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 113–22.
16 In philosophical logic and philosophy of language, the main focus is
on the meanings of linguistic items such as sentences, rather than the mean-
ings of non-linguistic items such as gestures, rituals or natural entities. In
what follows, however, I adopt a conception of meaning which accords
more closely with the way that term – and related English words, such as
‘significance’ - are used in ordinary discourse. That strategy would be criti-
cised by some writers, including Dan Sperber, but it has been defended by
several others, including Thomas E. Hill andDavid E. Cooper (see Sperber,
Rethinking Symbolism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975),
8–9; Hill, The Concept of Meaning (London: Routledge, 1971), v; Cooper,
op. cit. note 8, Chapter 1). Cooper, for his part, argues that to explain the
meaning of any ‘thing’ is to show how it is ‘appropriate’ to ‘what is either
larger than or outside itself’ (where ‘appropriateness’ is conceived as a
kind of normative, rather than causal, relation), and this enables him to con-
sider the meanings of a wide variety of ‘things’, including gestures, rituals
and even what Dilthey called ‘Life’ itself. I merely mention Cooper’s pos-
ition in passing since there is insufficient space, here, to provide a detailed
account, still less a defence, of it. In any case, the argument set out in the
rest of the paper does not presuppose the truth of Cooper’s account, so
rejecting it need not compel one to reject the argument.
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of the meaningsMabey discusses count as folklore and, like other items
of folklore, many of them are in danger of being lost. With the gradual
passing of the generations and the transformation of rural life, it is likely
that many of the ‘folk’ meanings described in Flora and other such
works will disappear. So while Mabey is rightly aware of the dangers
of unreflective nostalgia, it might seem that Flora is, at least to some
extent, a work of preservation.17 It is true that it has not directly pre-
vented any plants from being harmed or killed. (In fact its high print
run might have resulted in a large number of them being pulped.)
But it might have saved some of nature’s meanings from being lost,
and that might seem to be preservation of a sort.
2.
To clarify: I am employing the terms ‘nature’ and ‘the natural world’ –
which I will use interchangeably – to denote the distinctive subject
matter of natural history. Furthermore, I have stipulated that to refer
to the meanings of an entity is to refer to the ways that it makes sense
to or has significance for people. And finally, interpreting ‘nature’
and ‘meaning’ in these ways, I have mooted the suggestion that
nature’s meanings can be preserved.
Is this suggestion plausible? Writers such as Mabey have certainly
had a great deal to say about the archaic meanings that have been at-
tributed to nature, the fact that certain kinds of organism were once
regarded as protections from evil, say, or as symbols of religious
truths. Yet although they have evidently managed to record those
meanings, it is not clear that they have managed to preserve any of
them. Perhaps, to be sure, works such as Flora have been able to pre-
serve some of those meanings as museum pieces, comforting curios-
ities for modern-day nature lovers. But they are unlikely to have
preserved them as they were once lived. For instance, twenty-first
century nature lovers can read Mabey’s account of the healing
rituals associated with ash trees, noting, in a cool, detached sort of
way, that their rural forebears might once have taken those trees to
have had certain meanings. But they cannot live those meanings in
theway that they were once lived by thosewho took the power of sym-
pathetic magic for granted. As William James would have said, those
meanings cannot become ‘hot and alive’ for them.18 Indeed, more
17 See Mabey 1996, op. cit. note 9, 7–8.
18 See The Varieties of Religious Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1985), 163.
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generally, it is clearly not feasible to preserve all of the meanings our
forebears saw in nature, for to preserve many of them one would need
to preserve (or revive) the forms of life in which those meanings have
(or had) their proper homes, and in the vast majority of cases this
would be to struggle, futilely, against the tide of history.
How then arewe to judge thosewho claim to have preserved nature’s
meanings? When the meanings in question are archaic, then they may
simply be fooling themselves. It may not be possible for them to
recover a pre-modern vision of the world. In some cases, in fact, the
meanings the would-be preservers take themselves to be preserving
might be of recent provenance and so not archaic at all.19Awish to pre-
serve nature’s meanings could, for example, reflect a mistaken belief
that there was once an age of ‘Merrie England’ in which good
country folk lived in contented harmony with each other and with
the land. Since this world has only ever existed in fantasy novels,
Sunday evening comedy dramas and the like, its meanings can be
neither preserved nor restored, and any attempt to do either is likely
to indicate a nostalgic longing for a past that never was.
In many instances, then, it will not be clear that nature’s meanings
can be preserved. And even if it is feasible to preserve some of nature’s
meanings, it is a further question whether such efforts should be wel-
comed. Certainly, with the passing of time, some of nature’s mean-
ings have become vulnerable to loss. In many of these cases,
however, the prospect of loss need not be regarded as a bad
outcome, still less one that there are reasons, moral or otherwise, to
avoid. Take the ancient tendency to demonise certain animals.20
Meanings of this sort resurface from time to time in stories of
baby-snatching urban foxes and the like, but there is surely no
reason to preserve them. Such superstitions we could well do
without. Or, to give another example, consider early modern,
European views of mountains. In The Sacred Theory of the Earth,
Thomas Burnet conjectured that the smooth surface of the newly
created earth had been broken by theGreat Flood, leaving the ‘shape-
less and ill-figur’d’ heaps of rock that we now know as mountains.21
19 On the recent provenance of many ‘traditions’, see E. Hobsbawm and
T. Ranger (eds) The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983).
20 See, e.g., Buczacki (op. cit. note 9) on yellowhammers (180), swifts
(311), swallows (321) and magpies (359–60).
21 Quoted in M. H. Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory:
The Development of the Aesthetic of the Infinite (New York: Cornell
University Press, 1959), 210.
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For Burnet, then, mountains were ‘Ruins of a broken world’, or, as
Robert Macfarlane puts it, ‘gigantic souvenirs of humanity’s sinful-
ness’.22 Such views were once popular in intellectual circles – they
are prominent, for instance, in the works of John Donne and
Andrew Marvell.23 Yet to twenty-first century thinkers, even
twenty-first century theists, they seem to indicate a regrettable
inability to see what the Romantics saw, namely the beauty of
nature’s irregularity. It is, in any case, no cause for regret that such
views are now so unpopular.
3.
In many cases, then, it will not be feasible to preserve the meanings
that were once attributed to nature. Moreover, even when the mean-
ings in question can become ‘hot and alive’ formodern audiences, it is
a further question whether they should be preserved. When the
meanings evince certain sorts of prejudice there may, in fact, be
moral reasons to ensure that they are not preserved. Hence it is not
clear that we should regard works such as Flora as valuable exercises
in meaning-preservation.
Yet one must take care not to infer too much from this, for the
meanings discussed in Flora and other such works are not all
bizarre and archaic.24 Although Mabey, Cocker et al. often appeal
to historical sources, many of the meanings they discuss can be
readily grasped by modern readers. As Mabey explains:
[W]hat we have found in the field research for Flora Britannica,
and in the multitude of public contributions to it, is that Britain
still has a lively popular culture of plants. Althoughwilder super-
stitions have faded… the ancient engagements between plants,
people and places continue unabated.25
Althoughworks such asFlora havemuch to say about history, they do
more than simply revive a constellation of strange and ancient super-
stitions. Instead, they manage to convey the rich variety of meanings
that nature still has for us – us twenty-first century readers. They
reveal the natural world to be generally meaningful, invested, that is,
22 Quoted in ibid., 200. R. Macfarlane, Mountains of the Mind:
A History of a Fascination (London: Granta, 2003), 27.
23 See Nicholson, op. cit. note 21, chapter 2.
24 Cf. Cocker and Mabey, op. cit. note 9, ix–x.
25 Mabey 1996, op. cit. note 9, 9.
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with a range of political, religious, mythic, personal and historical
meanings.
In Flora, Mabey achieves this by informing his readers of the
various meanings that have been found in the natural world; he
tells them that certain plants have been taken to have certain mean-
ings. In this respect, Flora bears comparison with the works of cul-
tural geographers and environmental historians. Just as Mabey tells
his readers about the meanings of plants, so, as we saw, Rackham
devotes a significant part of his classic history of the British country-
side to expounding the meanings of natural entities.26 Likewise,
influential works such as Yi-Fu Tuan’s Topophilia and Simon
Schama’s Landscape and Memory inform their readers about what
Schama calls the ‘veins of myth and memory’ that lie beneath our
conventional views of natural landscapes.27
Natural historical, geographical and historical studies tell their
readers about nature’s meanings; however, meanings can of
course be conveyed in other ways, too. Poems, for instance, can
express meanings. Whereas a study in natural history might inform
the reader that hawks have frequently been regarded as emblems of
wildness or that the return of swifts to British skies in May might
be taken to symbolise the renewal of summer, a poet like Ted
Hughes can express those meanings in verse. Adopting an image
from Heidegger’s later work, poems like ‘Hawk Roosting’ and
‘Swifts’ might be said to ‘gather’ those meanings.28 Or consider the
work of Seamus Heaney. ‘Blackberry Picking’ does not tell the
reader that things seldom live up to our expectations; the story of
the rotting berries expresses the point metaphorically. ‘Death of a
Naturalist’ does not tell us that a boy came to regard the froggy popu-
lation of a local flax-dam as repellent; it expresses this change in
meaning.29
Hughes and Heaney work with words; yet nature’s meanings can
also be expressed through (or in) other artistic media. In some
26 Op. cit. note 2.
27 Y-F. Tuan, Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perceptions,
Attitudes, and Values (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974), S. Schama,
Landscape and Memory (London: Fontana Press, 1996), 14.
28 See, respectively,Ted Hughes (London: Faber and Faber, 2000), and
Season Songs (London: Faber and Faber, 1985). See also the discussion of
‘Swifts’ at Mabey 2005, op. cit. note 9, 19. On ‘gathering’, see Heidegger,
‘The Thing’, in A. Hofstadter (trans.) Poetry, Language, Thought (NY:
Harper & Row, 1971), 165–86.
29 Both poems are from Death of a Naturalist (London: Faber and
Faber, 1991).
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cases, in fact, the medium may itself be partly natural. Take Andy
Goldsworthy’sHiddenTrees: three huge branches, salvaged from for-
estrywork in a country park and set in a ha-ha. In his discussion of the
work, Mabey notes that it ‘reveals, in the depths of the ditch, the
reality that was hidden: reckless forest clearance, hard human
labour’.30 A similar effect could have been achieved by a great poet.
Yet while poems are not part of the natural world,31 it is not clear
that the same holds true ofHidden Trees. It consists of three branches
sunk into a ditch, surrounded by a dry stone wall but otherwise open
to the elements. It expresses nature’s meanings. Yet it would not be
absurd to think that it is part of nature, at least to some extent.
4.
I do not mean to suggest that the primary, still less the sole, effect of
all nature-focused works, from historical studies to land art, is to
reveal nature’s general meaningfulness. For one thing, the primary
effect of some such works is to convey nature’s strangeness and
‘otherness’, and it might reasonably be objected that this is not a rev-
elation ofmeaningfulness somuch as a recognition of the limits of our
attempts to find meaning in nature.32 Furthermore, I have not
claimed that nature’s general meaningfulness can only be revealed
through human works such as poems and land art. That claim is
false. Like artworks, natural entities often embody their meanings.33
For this reason, the best way to preserve the historical, political, etc.
meanings of an entity will, in many cases, be to preserve the entity,
rather than to write poems about it, for example. Indeed I admit
30 Mabey 2010b, op. cit. note 9, 155.
31 Excepting, perhaps, those of the T’ang dynasty Buddhist recluse,
Han Shan, which were said to have been etched onto cliffs and trees.
32 Thus Robert Macfarlane writes that the frozen shoulders of Ben
Hope in the Northwest Highlands of Scotland ‘refused any imputation of
meaning’ (The Wild Places (London: Granta, 2007), 157). Against such
claims, it could be contended that, like the artworks of Duchamp and
Schoenberg, some natural entities have a special significance or meaning
precisely because they resist being incorporated into our usual schemes of
significance.
33 On the embodiment of meaning in artworks, see Arthur C. Danto,
‘The end of art: A philosophical defence’, History and Theory 37: 4
(1998), 127–43. See also Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch’s discussion
of how national flags embody meanings in Meaning (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press), 72–3.
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that much more would need to be said to give a full account of all the
different ways that nature can be revealed to be meaningful: about
whether the ‘revealing’ is deliberate or unintentional, inventive or
banal; about whether it is achieved through literary devices, sensitive
historical research, the preservation of entities, or in some other way.
But I will not try to give a full account of these matters here. I have
merely suggested that nature can be revealed to be generallymeaning-
ful – permeated, that is, with historical, mythic, religious, personal
and political significance. And, without going into much detail, I
have suggested that this can be achieved through a wide range of
human works, from those of writers like Mabey and Annie Dillard
to the artworks of individuals such as Goldsworthy and David Nash.
It is one thing to claim that certain works reveal nature to be gen-
erally meaningful but quite another to say that any of them preserve
that meaningfulness, for to say this is to imply that that meaningful-
ness is under threat, that people are becoming – or are at risk of be-
coming – insensitive to the historical, mythic, religious and
political significance of the natural world. Now if all the world’s
inhabitants were as perceptive and imaginative as Mabey, Heaney
and Goldsworthy, then no such threat would exist, and so nature’s
meaningfulness could not be preserved. But of course our world,
the post-industrial context in which we live our lives, is not like
this. True, many people are alive to nature’s general meaningfulness;
no doubt,manyof them are becomingmore andmore aware of the his-
torical, mythic, religious, personal and political meanings of nature.
But our world is also marked by certain countervailing tendencies.
Begin by considering the thesis that the natural sciences are our
only means of knowing anything that is worth knowing about
reality.34 This view seems to be growing in popularity, in part due
to support from prominent figures such as Stephen Hawking and
Richard Dawkins.35 For its advocates, it must be possible to
express anything that is worth knowing about the natural world in
terms of causal relations and other scientifically respectable concepts.
In cases of what H. P. Grice called ‘natural meanings’ –when, for in-
stance, it is said that grey clouds mean rain or that a fever means the
34 This is a form of what Mikael Stenmark calls ‘axiological scientism’.
See his book Scientism: Science, Ethics and Religion (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2001), 11–3.
35 Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design: New
Answers to theUltimate Questions in Life (London: BantamBooks, 2010), 13.
For evidence of Dawkins’s scientism, see the extract from his 1991 Royal
Institution Christmas Lecture quoted in op. cit. note 34, 19–20.
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‘flu – this sort of translation might seem feasible.36 Yet most advo-
cates of scientism will find it difficult to see how claims about, say,
nature’s historical meanings could be adequately expressed in terms
of causal relations and the like.37 Some will draw the conclusion
that history and other such disciplines cannot tell us anything
worth knowing about the world of hedgehogs, humus and horse
chestnuts; some may even doubt whether they can tell us anything
at all about how nature really is as opposed to how it merely seems
to us.38 Either way, advocates of scientism will see little epistemic
value in efforts to reveal nature’s historical, mythic, religious and pol-
itical meanings.
A related threat to nature’s meaningfulness is the increasing ten-
dency for policymakers to adopt a ‘managerial’ idiom when talking,
writing and (presumably) thinking about the natural world.
Whether one is considering a Government White Paper on rural
affairs, a declaration on sustainability from a private corporation, or
the mission statement of an environmental pressure group, one typi-
cally encounters the same set of all too familiar references – to the
rolling out of strategies, the embedding of commitments, the fixing
of objectives, the setting of targets, the estimation of added value,
the determination of key performance indicators and the identifi-
cation of best practice. Such language has its uses of course, and in
any case it would be absurd to recommend that managers start
trying to write their reports in more evocative, Hughes- or Heaney-
esque styles. Be that as it may, the idiom of strategies, objectives,
and key performance indicators is a poor vehicle for the communi-
cation of nature’s meanings. On the one hand, this is because of the
emphasis managerially-minded thinkers place on measurability, as
epitomised in the perennial demand that management objectives be
SMART (that is, specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and
timely). Talk of values can lend itself to being expressed in such
36 See H. P. Grice, ‘Meaning’, The Philosophical Review 66 (1957):
377–88. Not all commentators believe that this sort of translation is feasible.
See, for example, Cooper’s discussion of the statement ‘Those clouds mean
rain’. This, he contends, is not simply a statement of some regularity or
causal connections. Rather, it is in virtue of the appropriateness within a
human practice of using clouds as signs of rain that talk of the clouds’
meaning something has its point. See op. cit. note 8, 36–7.
37 Most, but not all. A small proportion of those who endorse axiologi-
cal scientismwill be familiar with work in the philosophy of language, and of
these a small proportion will subscribe to causal theories of meaning.
38 The latter suggests a commitment to what Stenmark calls ‘epistemic
scientism’ (op. cit. note 34, 4–5).
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terms (hence the popularity of appeals to ‘added value’ or to the cash
value of nature’s ‘services’). However, meanings are hard to quantify
and prone, therefore, to being overlooked in discussions that are con-
ducted exclusively in managerial terms. On the other hand, the fam-
iliar managerial idiom of strategies, objectives and key performance
indicators is simply too bland to convey the meanings of things. As
Orwell observed, managerial prose seems to consist ‘less and less
of words chosen for the sake of their meaning, and more and more
of phrases tacked together like the sections of a prefabricated hen-
house.’39 References to the rolling out of strategies, the embedding
of commitments and the identification of best practice are simply
too insipid to capture the rich variety of political, historical,
mythic, religious and personal meanings that people find in the
natural world. Hence a devotion to this sort of rhetoric can blind
one to nature’s meaningfulness.
MartinHeidegger thought that the rise of scientistic-cum-manage-
rial philistinismwas a ‘destining’ (Geschick) of history.40 In fact he in-
sisted that the greatest ‘danger’ facing us moderns is not that of
nuclear war, but the possibility that the ‘calculative thinking’ typi-
cally practised by modern advocates of scientism and managerialism
‘may someday come to be accepted and practiced [sic] as the only way
of thinking’.41 I do not want to go that far. It is not clear to me that
philistinism has permeated all aspects of society. Nonetheless, as
commentators such as Frank Furedi have noted, it seems to be
spreading, at least in some quarters.42 And if this impression is accu-
rate, then nature’s meaningfulness can be preserved. If it is accurate,
then the works of men and women such as Mabey, Dillard and
Goldsworthy do not merely reveal nature to be generally meaningful;
they serve as bulwarks, preserving nature’s meaningfulness against
the forces that would destroy it.43
39
‘Politics and the English Language’, in Orwell, Essays (London:
Penguin, 1994), 348–359, at 350.
40
Basic Writings, ed. D. F. Krell (London: Routledge, 1993), 329.
41
Discourse on Thinking, trans. J. M. Anderson and E. H. Freund
(New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 56 (emphasis removed).
42 See further, F. Furedi, Where Have All the Intellectuals Gone?
Confronting 21
st
Century Philistinism (London: Continuum, 2004).
43 Talk of ‘bulwarks’ might seem needlessly alarmist. At any rate, it
suggests that it is a bad thing, indeed something that there are moral or
other sorts of reason to avoid, when people lose their sense of nature’s mean-
ingfulness. Various arguments could be offered in support of this last claim.
For example, it could be argued that the members of a philistine society will
typically be unable to live truly worthwhile lives. I do not have space, here,
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5.
There have recently been a number of calls for those in disciplines
such as fine arts, history and sociology to justify what they do.44
The relevant justification is typically economic, the demand being
that those who pursue these disciplines explain how their efforts con-
tribute to national economic goals. Recognising that they are unlikely
to contribute much to the GDP, fiscally-minded philistines will no
doubt have special concerns about the utility of the intellectual and
artistic pursuits commended in this paper. What use, they will ask,
is environmental history, for instance, or land art? What ends are
served by works such as Landscape and Memory or Hidden Trees?
The argument set out above provides one response. It is true that
to preserve natural entities one needs people whose work stands a
chance of having a quick and direct practical impact. Yet preserving
nature’smeaningfulness requires the efforts of the sorts of individuals
I have mentioned above: not necessarily academics, still less aca-
demics belonging to any particular faculty, but men and women
like Goldsworthy, Heaney, Dillard, Mabey and Schama – people
whose work exemplifies all that is best in the arts, the humanities
and the qualitative social sciences.45
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to develop this argument. But for an indication as to how it might go, see
Peter Goldie’s intriguing remarks on the effects of Soviet philistinism in
‘Towards a Virtue Theory of Art’, British Journal of Aesthetics 47: 4
(2007), 372–87, at 385.
44 See further, M.Nussbaum,Not for Profit: WhyDemocracy Needs the
Humanities (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).
45 I would like to thank David E. Cooper, Andy Hamilton, Dawn M.
Wilson andMatthew Ratcliffe for the very helpful comments they provided
on drafts of this paper.
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